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Models of the Will and Negative
Disinheritance
by Frederic S. Schwartz"
I. INTRODUCTION
The issue of so-called negative disinheritance arises when a testator
provides in her will that a particular person or persons (whom I shall
call the "negative beneficiary(s)") shall take none of the testator's
property upon her death.' Under the orthodox (and still almost
universal) rule, such a disinheritance provision2 is ineffective? If the
negative beneficiary becomes the testator's heir4 and some property
passes in intestacy (because the testator has not named or described

Professor of Law, Oklahoma City University. Harvard Law School (J.D., 1976).
1. The issue is also raised when the testator provides that the negative beneficiary
shall take no part of her property in addition to the property passing by an affirmative
*

devise. See infra text at note 11.
2. The courts and commentators commonly use the term "negative disinheritance" to
describe such a provision. E.g., In re Estate of Farber, 204 N.W.2d 478, 481 (Wis. 1973);
4 WILLIAM J. BowE & DOUGLAS H. PARKER, PAGE ON THE LAW OF WILLS § 30.17 (1961).
I do not favor.that term; surely what we wish to characterize as "negative" is not the
disinheritance itself--every disinheritance is negative in the sense that the heirs are
deprived of property they would otherwise take-but the language that expresses the
intent to disinherit. Thus, in my view, it is appropriate to speak of negative words (or
language, etc.) of disinheritance (a statement that a certain heir shall receive no part of the
estate) and affirmative words of disinheritance (language that disinherits the heirs by
distributing all the testator's property, or the residue, to others). Throughout this Article,
I shall use the expression "disinheritance provision" to refer to negative words of
disinheritance. Although the phrase literally includes affirmative words of disinheritance
as well, in the present context it should cause no confusion.
3. See, e.g., In re Estate of Levy, 196 So. 2d 225, 229 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1967); Strohm
v. McMullen, 89 N.E.2d 383, 387 (Ill. 1949); Coffman v. Coffiman, 8 S.E. 672 passim (Va.
1888) (reviewing several early cases); 4 BOWE & PARKER, supra note 2, § 30.17, at 115 &
n.1; J. Andrew Heaton, Comment, The Intestate Claims of HeirsExcluded by Will: Should
"Negative Wills"Be Enforced?, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 177, 178 n.6 (1985) (citing cases).
4. The negative beneficiary may become the sole heir or one of several heirs.
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beneficiaries for all her property), the negative beneficiary will take his
intestate share of that property. Thus, under the orthodox rule, a
testator can prevent an heir from taking in intestacy only by making
affirmative dispositions of all the testator's property.5
Despite its condemnation by a commentator,' the orthodox rule
continues to be enthusiastically endorsed by the courts. The cases in
which it is rejected are extremely few.7 Yet those who condemn the rule
have not explained its attraction. Appeals for judicial or legislative
reform will likely fail unless the rule's appeal is exposed and refuted.
In this Article, I seek to do so.
My argument, in short, is that the rule denying effect to a disinheritance provision is a consequence of the fact that the courts have
implicitly rejected one model of the will in favor of another. The rejected
model-the will as a directive-represents the will (obviously enough) as
the testator's instructions regarding ownership of her property after her
death. Under the model implicitly favored by the courts, the will as a
declaration,the will is, in effect, a post-mortem deed, an instrument
creating ownership. Such a model is very uncongenial to a disinheritance provision. Moreover, the proposals for reform-what I shall call
the "standard remedies" for the orthodox rule-will not be successful
unless the courts abandon the declaration model in favor of the directive
model.
In Part I of this Article, I consider the possible justifications for the
orthodox rule. In Part II, I describe the directive model of the will and
discuss its implications for the effectiveness of a disinheritance provision.
In Part III, I do the same for the declaration model. In Part IV, I show
that the judicial treatment of disinheritance provisions reflects the
declaration model. In Part V, I discuss the deficiencies of the standard
remedies. Finally, in Part VI, I recapitulate what the preceding
discussion implies: Judicial adoption of the directive model of the will
provides the best, and probably the only, path to reform.
II. THE ORTHODOX RULE EVALUATED
Consider a testator whose heirs are her two brothers, B1 and B2. Her
will states that B2 is to receive no part of the estate. The residuary

5. See generally Heaton, supra note 3; Annotation, Effect of Will ProvisionCutting off
Heir or Next of Kin, or Restricting Him to Provision Made, To Exclude Him from

Distributionof Intestate Property, 100 A.L.R.2d 325 (1965); John W.Fisher, II & Scott A.
Curnutte, Reforming the Law of Intestate Succession and Elective Shares: New Solutions

to Age-old Problems, 93 W. VA. L. REV. 61, 68-72 (1990),
6. Heaton, supra note 3, at 183-87.
7. See infra note 45.
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clause is ineffective' or absent. In virtue of the rule that a disinheritance provision is ineffective, the residue passes to both brothers equally,
including the negative beneficiary,9 B2.10
The rule would be invoked also if the will contains a devise to B2 and
provides further that B2 is to receive no additional part of the testator's
estate. Again, under the orthodox rule any property whose disposition
is not described by any affirmative provision passes in intestacy equally
to B1 and B2. Note that in this case, also, we can properly refer to a
"disinheritance provision" relating to B2. Although the will does not
purport to provide that B2 shall take no part of the testator's estate, it
does provide, in effect, that B2 shall not inherit any part of the estate. 1
The orthodox rule denying effect to a disinheritance provision has been
criticized. 2 We shall see later in this Article that the proposed
remedies are inadequate."3

8. It may be completely ineffective or partially ineffective. The former occurs when,
for example, the sole residuary beneficiary predeceases the testator. The latter occurs
when one of several residuary beneficiaries predeceases the testator and the court applies
the majority rule that a partial intestacy results. See, e.g., Moffett v. Howard, 392 So. 2d
509, 512 (Miss. 1981); 4 BOWE & PARKER, supra note 2, § 33.56, at 390-91; 6 id. § 50.18,
at 97; Annotation, Devolution of Lapsed Portion of Residuary Estate, 36 A.L.R.2d 1117
§ 2(a) (1954). In the case of a partially ineffective residuary clause, only the lapsed portion
of the residue would pass as described in the text.
9. I shall speak of the person whom the testator wishes to exclude as a "negative
beneficiary."
10. A variation of the rule appears in In re Estate of Scott, 659 So. 2d 361 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1995), in which a disinheritance provision was ineffective to prevent taking under
an antilapse statute. The testator stated in her will that she "specifically and intentionally
make[s] no provisions" for her nephews, issue of the testator's sister (who was herself a
beneficiary). Id. at 362. Because the sister predeceased the testator, the antilapse statute
created a substitute devise in the nephews "[uinless a contrary intention appears in the
will." Id. (quoting FLA. STAT. ANN. § 732.603 (West 1995)). The court held that the issue
took, basing its decision on two cases holding a disinheritance provision ineffective to
prevent heirs from taking in intestacy. Id.
11. The examples in the text assume also that the disinheritance provision names the
negative beneficiary or heirs. A disinheritance provision might take the alternative form
of stating that no heir can take (or, indeed, no person can take) except those named or
described. For example, in In re Estate of Cancik, 476 N.E.2d 738 (Ill. 1985), the testator
stated in his will, "I have intentionally omitted the names of any of my relatives,., for
reasons I deem good and sufficient, with the exception of my aforesaid cousin, Charles E.
Cancik." Id. at 739. Charles E. Cancik was an heir and the beneficiary of all the testators
personal property. The court held, applying the traditional rule, that the intestate
property passed to all the heirs. Id. at 741.
12. Heaton, supra note 3, at 183-87. But see Alfred Gordon, Note, Elicitingthe True
Intent of a Testator: Do Negative Wills Have a Place?, 13 PROB. L.J. 1, 11-27 (1995)
(defending the rule).
13. See infra text accompanying notes 123-38.
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The justifications given by the courts themselves in support of the
orthodox rule are unsatisfactory."
In the early, leading case of
5 the court stated the rule and the supposed
Zimmerman v. Hafer,"
reason for the rule as follows:
"[Tihough the intention to disinherit the heir be ever so apparent, he
must, of course, inherit, unless the estate is given to somebody else;
and the reason is that the law provides how a man's estate at his death
shall go, unless he, by his will, plainly directs that it shall be disposed
of differently." An explicit and unequivocal declaration, therefore, that
the heir shall not inherit, will be wholly ineffectual to defeat
his right
5
unless the estate be given by the will to some one else.
To the extent the subsequent cases attempt to justify the orthodox
rule, they do so mostly on terms similar to those used in Zimmerman:
A disinheritance provision is ineffective because it represents an attempt
by the testator to dispose of property over which she has no power of
disposition, and the reason she has no such power is that the property
is already subject to the intestacy statute. Thus, courts have stated that
a disinheritance provision "can only apply to property actually passing
through the will and has no effect as to intestate property" 7 and that
"the intestate property passes by law rather than by will, [and therefore]
the statute and not the testator controls the distribution of this
property.""
Our immediate inclination, perhaps, is to dismiss this justification as
obviously circular. The negative beneficiary takes in intestacy, the
courts are saying, because the will fails to make any other disposition-when whether the will has made some other disposition is the very
question under consideration. The court in Zimmerman, in the passage
quoted, is particularly striking in this regard. Surely it is a profound
mystery why the requirement that the testator "plainly direct[] that [his
estate) shall be disposed of differently" than by the intestacy statute was

14. They are reviewed and criticized in Heaton, supra note 3, at 186-87.
15.

32 A. 316 (Md. 1895).

16. Id. at 318 (citation omitted). The court indicates that the quotation is from Denn
v. Gaskin, 98 Eng. Rep. 1292 (1777), but in fact only the quoted language preceding the
semicolon appears in the opinion as printed in English Reports.
17. In re Estate of Swanson, 140 N.W.2d 665,667 (Neb. 1966); cf In re Estate of Smith,
353 S.W.2d 721, 724 (Mo. 1962) ("[t]he negative admonition applies only to property
passing under the will").
18. Cook v. Seeman, 858 S.W.2d 114, 115 (Ark. 1993). Essentially the same rationale
is given in Kimley v. Whittaker, 306 A.2d 443, 444 (N.J. 1973), discussed infra text
accompanying notes 104-19. See also In re Weissmann's Will, 243 N.Y.S. 127, 131 (Surr.
Ct. 1930) (ascribing orthodox rule to "the English conception of the semivested rights of a
natural heir in his ancestor's estate").
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not satisfied in that case by the testator's "ever so apparent" "intention
to disinherit the heir."
To say that the courts have failed to give a noncircular justification for
the orthodox rule is not to say that none exists. 9 The candidates for
a justification are not, however, satisfactory.
In the first place, the statutory text contains no clear authority for
denying effect to a disinheritance provision. The statutory requirements
for a valid will are formal requirements only. 2' Nor can a basis for the
orthodox rule be found in the text of the intestacy statutes. To be sure,
the terms of those statutes typically specify the distribution of "property
not disposed of by will" to the persons listed as heirs. 2 But, again, the
very question at issue is whether property that, according to the terms
of the will, is not to go to the negative beneficiary is "property ...
disposed of by will" for purposes of preempting the provisions of the
intestacy statute. Moreover, it is the general purport of the intestacy
statutes that their provisions be overridden by indications of a contrary
intent in a properly executed will. There is no justification, then, for
construing the phrase "disposed ofr (or similar language) narrowly to
exclude a negative "disposition."
To be sure, some alleged disinheritance provisions should be ineffective by virtue of the rule that any will provision that is hopelessly vague
is ineffective.22 That is the case when a will lacks an explicit statement
that an heir take nothing but contains some other provision arguably
indicating such an intent.' Or, if the will makes only a small devise,
say ten dollars, to an heir, an inference of an intent that the heir take
nothing more by way of intestacy is problematic.24 There is no denying

19. For a defense of the traditional rule, see Gordon, supra note 12 (arguing that a
disinheritance provision requires impermissible speculation about the intended takers and
that such a provision is not even reliable evidence of an intent to disinherit in the first
place).
20. A will must be in writing and signed by the testator (except for nuncupative wills
in very limited circumstances); a nonholographic will must be attested and signed by
witnesses. There is also the requirement of testamentary intent, see infra notes 31-32 and
accompanying text, but a disinheritance provision poses no special problem relating to that.
21. E.g., MD. CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS § 3-101 (1991) (property "not effectively
disposed of by [the testator's] will"); N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 4-1.1 (McKinney
Supp. 1995) (property "not disposed of by will").
22. See Early v. Arnold, 89 S.E. 900, 902 (Va. 1916) (holding void for uncertainty a
devise to "whoever has been [the] best friend" of the testators son); LaMere v. Jackson, 284
N.W. 659, 661 (Mich. 1939); 4 BOWE & PARKER, supra note 2, § 34.37, at 476-77.
23. Gordon, supra note 12, at 11-16.
24. Cf In re Estate of McWilliams, 254 N.W.2d 277, 282 (Wis. 1977) (when the will
devised one-third of the personal property to the testator's wife, "(olne might read in the
will a wish to limit [her] to one-third"; but such an inference would not prevent heirs from
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that such cases of irremediable vagueness exist. Obviously, however,
they cannot justify a rule that makes any disinheritance provision
ineffective, no matter how clearly it may express the testator's intent
that the negative beneficiary inherit nothing.25
On the other hand, one might attempt to justify the orthodox rule on
the basis of an indeterminacy distinct from the kinds of vagueness we
have just considered. To give effect to a disinheritance provision
requires that the potential intestate share of the negative beneficiary be
received by someone else, but the testator has not stated who that
someone else is. Determining a substitute recipient of that share, the
argument goes, would require the court to engage in impermissible
speculation about the testator's intent regarding distribution of her
property.2"
No doubt this defense of the orthodox rule has the greatest surface
appeal, but it is not a satisfactory justification for the orthodox rule
either. To see why that is so requires a consideration of the essential
nature of a will. The next part of this Article discusses one model of a
will and shows that a disinheritance provision should be given effect
under that model.
III. THE MODEL OF THE WILL AS A DIRECTIVE
The directive model of a will starts with the obvious observation that
a will is an expression of the testator's desires regarding ownership of
her property after her death. This is not quite complete, however. We
would not wish to give effect to such an expression unless the testator

taking under orthodox rule); In re Forde's Estate, 108 N.Y.S.2d 715, 716 (Surr. Ct. 1951)
(bequest of $1 indicates an intent to disinherit); In re Estate of Barker, 448 So. 2d 28, 31
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984) (bequests of $1 "do not necessarily indicate an intent to 'disinhkit'
even if they did, property would pass to heirs under orthodox rule).
25. Gordon, supra note 12, at 11-14, makes the argument that even the typical, literal
disinheritance provision does not reliably indicate an intent that the negative beneficiary
take none of the intestate property. According to Gordon, a disinheritance provision can
express only an intent with respect to property that the testator knew would pass by
intestacy, and in almost all cases there is no property about which the testator has such
knowledge. This, it seems to me, is holding the disinheritance provision to a standard to
which no other provision is held. Indeed, the author concludes that
it appears that no language employed by a will drafter can show the clear intent
of the testator as to any property that remains undistributed under her will, since
she is presumed to have believed she would not die with any intestate property
....
Only if a testator lists all of her property and expressly states that her heir
is to receive none of it can a court ever be truly certain that the testator intends
her heir to have nothing.
Id. at 14-15 (emphasis added). In such a case, of course, there will be no intestacy anyway.
26. See Heaton, supra note 3, at 187; Gordon, supra note 12, at 2, 11-14, 20.
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intended that we do so. The courts have put this in terms of a
requirement of "testamentary intent":27 The testator must "intend[]
that very paper to take effect as a will." 8 Moreover, in most cases the
testator knows that the pattern of ownership she has described will be
brought about by the actions of the executor named in the will. Even if
the testator does not know this (because, for example, she has not named
an executor) or is mistaken in thinking so (because the executor she has
named does not qualify or refuses to serve, and another is appointed in
his place), still the testator knows that someone has the duty and power
to distribute her property in accordance with her desires as set forth in
the will.
We can take account of these aspects of a will by saying that a will is
a list of instructions by the testator regarding distribution of her
property after her death. As such it is a list of directives,29 attempts by
the writer "to get the [personal representative] to do something." s For
simplicity, I shall use the term "directive" to refer to the will as a whole
as well as each dispositive provision.3 1
I readily concede-indeed, I hope-that the directive model appears to
be a very simple and obvious one. These are precisely the characteristics
that so strongly recommend it. Yet, we shall see that the courts have
implicitly rejected it in their treatment of disinheritance provisions.
What does the model imply about the effectiveness of a disinheritance
provision? The testator's expression of a desire that Bob not own any

27. 1 BOWE & PARKER, supra note 2, § 5.14, at 195-99; Lawrence Lanctot, Comment,
A Letter as a Will or Codicil: Testamentary Intent in California,2 U.S.F. L. REV. 367, 36768 (1968).

28. Early v. Arnold, 89 S.E. 900, 901 (Va. 1916). See also McBride v. McBride, 67 Va.
(26 Gratt.) 476 (1875):
A paper is not to be established as a man's will merely by proving that he
intended to make a disposition of his property similar to or even identically the
same with that contained in the paper. It must satisfactorily appear that he
intended the very paper to be his will.
Id. at 481 (quotation marks omitted) (quoting a "Judge Cabell" but source otherwise not
indicated), quoted in In re Henry's Estate, 248 N.W. 853, 855 (Mich. 1933).
29.

JOHN R. SEARLE & DANIEL VANDERVEKEN, FOUNDATIONS OF ILLOCUTIONARY LOGIC

198, 201 (1985). We are here using the terminology of the theory of illocutionary acts,
given rough outline in J.L. AUSTIN, How TO Do THINGS WITH WORDS 98 & passim (2d ed.

1975) but described more completely by the philosopher John Searle. See generally JOHN
R. SEARLE, EXPRESSION AND MEANING (1979) [hereinafter SEARLE, EXPRESSION AND
MEANING]; SEARLE & VANDERVEKEN, supra; JOHN R. SEARLE, SPEECH ACTS (1969)
[hereinafter SEARLE, SPEECH ACTS].
30. SEARLE, EXPRESSION AND MEANING, supra note 29, at 13.

31. To be precise, the will is not the directive but the means by which the testator
performs the directive(s). The distinction is not important for the purposes of this Article,
however.
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part of the testators property has as much the character of a directive-an instruction to the personal representative-as does any
affirmative provision. The testator is instructing the personal representative to distribute the testator's property in such a way that the
negative beneficiary, Bob, will not become the owner of any of it. Now,
if the residuary clause fails and Bob turns out to be one of the testator's
heirs, the personal representative is receiving two conflicting instructions about distribution of the residue, one from the testator and one
from the legislature in the form of the intestacy statute. But the statute
itself states how this conflict is to be resolved: The testator's instructions take precedence. Therefore, the residue should be distributed in
accordance with the intestacy statute except to the extent that the
statute is inconsistent with the disinheritance provision. (Exactly what
this might mean is taken up in a subsequent paragraph.)
Earlier, we mentioned the problem of indeterminacy: The testator has
not said who should own the property that Bob would normally receive
as heir. Under the directive model of the will, however, this is not a
satisfactory justification for refusing to give effect to the disinheritance
provision. Certainly it is true that the testator has not specified a
recipient for the property that would normally go to the negative
beneficiary; by hypothesis there is a partial intestacy. The testator has
said only where that property is not to go. But it should be evident that
this lacuna in the testator's expressed intent makes the task of giving
effect to the testator's intent less problematic, not more so. The only
effective expression of the testator's intent with respect to the residue32
is the disinheritance provision. That provision can be given complete
effect by denying the negative beneficiary any share in the residue. The
task with which the personal representative is faced, then, is not to
fashion a distribution that complies with some ambiguously expressed
(or unexpressed) intent of the testator. Rather, his task is to fashion a
distribution that, while it fulfills the testator's (clearly and unambiguously expressed) intent that the negative beneficiary take nothing, also
fulfills the legislature's intent (as expressed in the intestacy statute) in
all other respects.3 3 That is, once the personal representative has

32. We continue to assume that the residuary clause is partly or wholly ineffective or,
indeed, absent.
33. A somewhat similar point is made in Heaton, supra note 3, at 184-85, in which the
author criticizes the traditional rule on the ground that the intestacy statute represents
the testator's probable intent and that, therefore, a contrary expression of intent in the
testator's will should be effective. What the author leaves largely unexplained is the
courts' widespread and longstanding adherence to the orthodox rule in the face of such an
obvious rationale for the effectiveness of a disinheritance provision. In this Article, I seek
to explain these matters by reference to the directive and declaration models.
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excluded the negative beneficiary as a recipient of the residue, selecting
the recipient(s) is a matter of applying the intestacy statute, not the will.
If there is a difficulty in determining the proper distribution of the
residue, it is a difficulty in determining the proper application of the
intestacy statute.
But I do not think that there is very much difficulty. Any aspect of
the statutory distribution that is inconsistent with the disinheritance
provision should be ineffective; otherwise, the statute should govern
normally. Consider our earlier example of the testator survived by her
two brothers, B1 and B2 (with B2 the negative beneficiary). Again we
assume that there is no valid residuary clause. The intestacy statute
provides for a distribution equally to B1 and B2. The testator has said
that no distribution shall be made to B2; therefore, we simply ignore
that part of the statute. The residue would be distributed entirely to B1,
This "simple-exclusion" rule seems to satisfy an
the other heir.'
important criterion: modification of the operation of the intestacy
statute to the least extent necessary to fulfill the testator's intent as
expressed in the disinheritance provision. s
There is another solution, however, that is preferable because it better
reflects the structure of the intestacy statute. We have said that any
part of the statutory distribution that is inconsistent with the disinheritance provision should be ineffective. But the statute itself provides, in
substance, for alternative distributions when part of it is ineffective.
Suppose the testator is still alive, and her only living relatives are her
brothers, B1 and B2, and the issue of B2. If the testator were to die
immediately, the intestacy statute would decree a distribution equally
to B and B2. If, however, B2 dies before the testator does, the potential
distribution to B2 becomes ineffective. Under these circumstances, the
statute provides for an alternative distribution: B2's potential share
goes to his issue. Similarly, if a disinheritance provision makes
ineffective a potential distribution to a presumptive heir, we should
apply the statute as if he had predeceased the testator. A provision
disinheriting B2 should result in an application of the intestacy statute
as if B2 predeceased the testator. Under this "nonsurvival rule," B1
would take half of the residue and B2's issue (if any) would take the

34. As the statute does not provide in terms for a distribution of one-halfto each of B1
and B2, but only for an equal distribution between them, ignoring B2"s share would result
in B1 taking all. If there were more than one other heir, the negative beneficiary's share
would be distributed among them in proportion to their shares under the intestacy statute.
35. To be sure, the simple-exclusion rule does more than simply exclude the negative
beneficiary because it gives the other heir, B1, a greater share in the intestate property

than he would have received in the absence of the disinheritance provision.
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other half. (Note that the testator has expressed no intention to
disinherit B2's issue.) If B2 dies without issue, then B1 would take the
entire residue, just as he would under the simple-exclusion rule. In the
remainder of this Article, I shall use the phrase "other intestate takers"
to refer to all those persons who would take under a nonsurvival rule.3"
The simple-exclusion rule seems to have been endorsed by one
American court 7 and the English courts.'
The Uniform Probate
Code,3 9 a state statute,40 and a commentator 4' have endorsed the
nonsurvival rule.
The most difficult circumstances for the application of a nonsurvival
rule are presented by a disinheritance provision stating that no "heir"
shall take. Here, the testator's intent may be unclear. If the testator is
survived only by B1, B2, and B2's issue, her heirs are B1 and B2. Does
the testator intend by the disinheritance provision to exclude only B1
and B2? In that case, B2's issue would take under a nonsurvival rule.
Or does the testator intend to exclude all actual and "potential" heirs,
that is, B1, B2, and B2's issue-and indeed all relatives of a more
remote degree of kindred? In that case, the nonsurvival rule would
mandate a distribution to the state under the escheat provision of the
intestacy statute. This does present a difficult case of ambiguity, but the
courts should admit extrinsic evidence of the testator's intent just as
they do in any other case of ambiguity.
There are two important points for present purposes. First, fashioning
an adequate solution for distribution of the testator's estate should be an
exercise in interpreting the intestacy statute, not the will. That exercise
does not, I believe, present insuperable difficulties. Whatever difficulties
36. I am avoiding use of the phrase "other heirs" because the persons to whom I am
referring might not be heirs. In the case of the testator survived by B1, B2, and B2's issue,
for example, B2's issue (who would take under a nonsurvival rule if B2 were the negative
beneficiary) are not heirs.
37. LaMere v: Jackson, 284 N.W. 659, 661 (Mich. 1939) (giving no explanation and
without explicitly rejecting the orthodox rule).
38. In re Wynn, [1984] 1 W.L.R. 237, 241 (Ch. D. 1983). See Gordon, supra note 12, at
2-4; Heaton, supra note 3, at 180.
39. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-101(b), 8 U.L.A. 97 (Supp. 1996) (negative beneficiary
treated as if he had disclaimed); id. § 2-801(d)(1), 8 U.L.A. 195 (Supp. 1996) (disclaimant
generally treated as predeceasing the decedent); see also id. § 1-201(56), 8 U.L.A. 14 (Supp.
1996) ("will" includes a testamentary instrument containing only a disinheritance
provision). See infra notes 127-29 and accompanying text.
40. 20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2101 (Supp. 1995) (mandating distribution as if negative
beneficiary had disclaimed); id. § 6205(b) (disclaimant treated as having predeceased the
decedent); see also N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 1-2.19 (McKinney Supp. 1995)
(formerly § 1-2.18) (authorizing a disinheritance provision but not providing otherwise how
the property is to be distributed).
41. Heaton, supra note 3, at 188-93. But see discussion infra note 126.
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do appear cannot justify a court in decreeing a distribution that is
clearly at odds with the testator's intent unambiguously expressed in a
disinheritance provision.
Second, denying effect to a disinheritance provision is still less
justified in circumstances in which the interpretation and application of
the intestacy statute are, or should be, absolutely clear. If, for example,
the testator's only surviving relatives are her two brothers, B1 and B2,
and B2 is disinherited, we are faced with the statute's mandate that B1
and B2 take equally and the testator's instruction that B2 take nothing.
Under any intestacy statute that gives precedence to the wishes
expressed in a valid will (and, of course, they all do), there can be no
serious doubt that distribution of the entire estate to B1 is well within
the terms of the statute. Yet even in this least problematic of cases, the
courts have refused to give effect to a disinheritance provision.42
Moreover, because the statutory construction required by the
nonsurvival rule is just that-construction--it is well within the
authority of the courts. As I stated earlier, the typical statute specifies
the distribution of "property not disposed of by will."43 Under a
reasonable reading of such a statute, its provisions are overridden by
any contrary expression of intent in a will; the nonsurvival rule attempts
to do no more than that.
Just as important, the analysis I have given does not require a court
to create any implied devises or other provisions in the will. In
particular, it is inappropriate (because it is unnecessary) to imply a
devise of the negative beneficiary's potential intestate share in favor of
other persons. To repeat: They take because the statute (as reasonably
construed) says so, not because the testator has (impliedly) said so."
Indeed, there is no significant difference between an affirmative
provision and a disinheritance provision under the directive model. In
virtue of either provision, the personal representative is receiving
conflicting instructions about distribution from the testator and the
legislature; in both cases, he resolves that conflict under a rule, given by
the legislature, that the testator's instructions take precedence. To the
extent that the intestacy statute is not in conflict with any of the

42. See cases discussed infra Part IV.
43. E.g., MD. CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS § 3-101 (1991) (property "not effectively

disposed of by [the testator's] will"); N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 4-1.1 (McKinney
Supp. 1995) (property "not disposed of by will").
44. For the contrary view, see Gordon, supra note 12, at 22 ("[a]llowing a negative will
[i.e., a disinheritance provision] to take effect is equivalent to writing an additional bequest

that the testator never contemplated").
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testator's instructions, it takes precedence. There is nothing very
complicated about this.
However, no court has endorsed this analysis. In a very few cases, the
courts have arrived at the result I have urged, giving effect to a
disinheritance provision by decreeing a distribution to the other intestate
takers; but no rationale was offered in those cases, and indeed the
orthodox rule was not even considered, much less explicitly rejected.4 5
Perhaps more to the point, no court that has endorsed the orthodox
model has done so in any way that recognizes this analysis. If the
analysis is correct, the only problematic aspect of giving effect to a
disinheritance provision is the necessity of judicial construction of the
intestacy statute. We would expect that ground to be the motivation for
a court's endorsement of the orthodox rule. The court would state its
reasoning, in substance, as follows: "We cannot give effect to the
disinheritance provision because we cannot tell who is to take the
intestate property. And we cannot tell who is to take the intestate
property because the intestacy statute is unclear on the matter, and we
lack any guidance for construing the statute." Although many courts
have, of course, refused to give effect to a disinheritance provision, no
court has done so on this ground.
The analysis I have given is based on the directive model of a will.
The almost complete absence from the cases of anything consistent with,
or responsive to, that analysis is evidence that the directive model does
not, in fact, reflect the courts' conception of a will. In the next part of
this Article, I shall consider an alternative model of the will and what
it implies for the effectiveness of a disinheritance provision.
45. In LaMere v. Jackson,, 284 N.W. 659, 661 (Mich. 1939), the court allowed a
disinheritance provision to take effect without explanation and, indeed, without explicitly
rejecting the orthodox rule.
In In re Fellman's Estate, 99 N.Y.S.2d 259 (Surr. Ct. 1944), the court gave effect to a
disinheritance provision. The will devised $3,000 to an heir "'inlieu of all interest in my
estate.'" Id. at 259 (quoting will). The court held, without explanation, that the
beneficiary-heir did not share in a lapsed portion of the residue. Id. at 259-60. Because
the disinheritance provision applied to a beneficiary however, the case is not necessarily
inconsistent with the orthodox rule. The court's (unstated) rationale might have been that
the disinheritance provision invoked the equitable election doctrine. Indeed, that was the
theory explicitly adopted in another case, Ward v. Dodd, 5 A. 650 (N.J. Ch.1886), discussed
infra text accompanying notes 61-66.
In Succession of Allen, 20 So. 193, 198 (La. 1896), the court gave effect to a disinheritance provision without discussion.
Some New Jersey cases state that a disinheritance provision will be given effect if the
testator's intent is clear, but in none of those cases does the court find that the testator's
intent was clear. See infra note 111 and accompanying text.
In In re Weissmann's Will, 243 N.Y.S. 127, 131-32 (Surr. Ct. 1930), the court explicitly
criticizes the orthodox rule but states that precedent requires adherence to it.
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IV. THE MODEL OF THE WILL AS A DECLARATION
Under the model of the will as a directive, as we have seen, the will
is viewed as a list of instructions by the testator to the personal
representative regarding distribution of her property after her death.
Under an alternative model, the will is viewed as an instrument-something that itself changes the ownership of the testator's
property. In this respect, the will is viewed rather like a post-mortem
deed.
Consider the nature of a deed. A deed is not simply the expression of
the grantor's desire that the grantee own the property. Nor is it, of
course, an instruction to another to make the grantee the owner.
Rather, the deed itself brings about that result.4 We would say that
the deed is a declaration.4" In virtue of the deed's statement that a
named person is the owner of an interest in property, he becomes so.
Under the model of a will as a declaration,4 a will acts in a similar
fashion. (For simplicity, I shall use the term "declaration" to refer to the
will as a whole as well as to each devise.4 9) We are not denying, of
course, that in the typical will each devise is literally the expression of
the testator's desire regarding ownership of her property after her death
or, perhaps, literally an instruction to the personal representative. But,
under the model, the essential nature of the devise is that of a declaration. The devise makes a named or described person the owner of part
of the testator's property simply by declaring him to be the owner. And,
to the extent that the will fails to declare someone the owner of
particular property, that property will pass to the persons described in
the intestacy statute.
How would a disinheritance provision fare under this model? Consider
a variation on one of the hypothetical examples discussed earlier. The
testator is survived only by her brothers, B1 and B2, who are her heirs.
The will devises Whiteacre to B1. A disinheritance provision expresses

46. The deed will be effective, however, only if it is delivered.
47. SEARLE & VANDERVEKEN, supra note 29, at 205-11. More precisely, we would say
that the deed is the means by which the grantor performs a declaration.
48. Devises are characterized as declarations in SEARLE & VANDERVEKEN, supra note
29, at 56; SEARLE, EXPRESSION AND MEANING, supra note 29, at 18; DENNIS KURZON, IT IS
HEREBY PERFORMED ... EXPLORATIONS IN LEGAL SPEECH ACTS §§ 4.2, 4.5 (1986)
(presenting a fuller and more complicated account). Cf F.R. PALMER, SEMANTICS 163 (2d
ed. 1981) (noting the similarity between the declaration "I name this ship Queen Elizabeth"
and "I give and bequeath my watch to my brother," but not using the term "declaration").
49. Again, to be precise, the will or devise is not the declaration but the means by
which the testator performs the declaration(s). The distinction is not important for the
purposes of this Article.
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the testator's desire that B2 own no part of the testator's estate. The
will lacks a valid residuary clause.
Now, if the affirmative devise of Whiteacre to B1 were stated in the
form of an explicit declaration, it would appear as, "I hereby make it the
case that B1 owns Whiteacre" 50 or something similar. If the disinheritance provision were stated in the form of an explicit declaration, it
would have to appear as, "I hereby make it the case that B2 owns no
part of my property" or something similar. There are several difficulties
in giving effect to this (restated) disinheritance provision-let us call it
a "negative declaration."
In the first place, the negative declaration does not appear to do
anything. It states what is already the case: that B2 owns no part of
the testator's property. It is not at all clear that such a statement can
properly be viewed as a declaration at all; the point or purpose of a
declaration "is to change the world in such a way that the propositional
content [here, that someone owns some property) matches the world."5 '
The only way that such a statement can do anything would be to divest
B2 of property that he has already received by intestate succession and
transfer it to B1.52 But this is not a satisfactory solution; it requires
the testator to control the ownership of property that belongs to another.
As we5 3 shall see below, this is exactly the position taken in one of the
cases.

The second objection is related to the first. Even if we were willing to
give effect to the disinheritance provision as a negative declaration, the
ownership it describes is consistent with anyone (or everyone) other than
B2 owning the residuary estate. 4 That is not a sufficient declaration
of ownership. The testator simply has not done her job under the
declaration model.
This appears to be the problem of indeterminacy that we discussed in
connection with the directive model. That problem was only apparent
under the directive model. The testator's responsibility under the
directive model is to give instructions to the personal representative.
The personal representative then determines what pattern of ownership
would be consistent with those instructions. The personal representative
is perfectly capable of taking into account an instruction even when, as

50. For simplicity I have omitted any statement of the time at which BI is the owner,
namely at the testator's death.
51. John R. Searle, How Performatives Work, 58 TENN. L. REV. 371, 376 (1991). See
generally SEARLE & VANDERVEKEN, supra note 29, at 205-11.

52. We have not, of course, answered the question of how it is possible to infer from the
statement that B2 take nothing a declaration that the entire residue belongs to B1.
53. See infra text accompanying notes 61-66.
54. See Gordon, supra note 12, at 2.
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in the case of a disinheritance provision, it does not completely
determine the ownership of property. In such a case, the personal
representative refers to the instructions contained in the intestacy
statute to supplement the testator's instructions.
Under the declaration model, by contrast, it is not enough for the
testator to make a partial provision with respect to particular property 5 --a partial declaration-and let the personal representative fill in
the rest by reference to the intestacy statute. Under the model, the
personal representative does not determine ownership of particular
property by reconciling the description of the owners found in the
intestacy statute with that, if any, found in the will. Rather, if the
testator wants to 'affect the ownership of her property after her death,
she must do it herself, by stating who the owners are. A declaration
that someone is not the owner does not work because, on one account, it
is not a declaration of ownership at all or because, on another account,
it is too indefinite to create ownership. So the intestacy statute steps in;
it acts upon property whose ownership the testator herself has not
successfully created.
Again, the indeterminacy of the negative declaration would be
remedied by using the distribution made by the intestacy statute as the
starting point. We could say that the intestacy statute acts first by
distributing the residue equally to B1 and B2; then the negative
declaration destroys B2's share, leaving the entire residue in Bl's hands
by some (so far unexplained) process of absorption. We have already
noted that this solution is unsatisfactory, however, because it requires
to someone else-an
the testator to affect property that already belongs
56
observation made in a case discussed below.

V. THE DECLARATION MODEL IN THE CASES

In this section, I return to a consideration of the caselaw on disinheritance provisions. My purpose is to discover the explanatory power of the
declaration model: The cases reflect an underlying assumption of the
will as a declaration.
Under the directive model, a disinheritance provision can be exactly
what it appears to be: an effective instruction to the personal representative to refrain from distributing any property to the negative
beneficiary. If a court operates under the directive model and if the

55. By "partial" I mean, of course, partial as to the recipients of particular property.
All provisions (except a devise of the entire estate) are partial as to property, and to the
extent they do not exhaust the testator's property, the intestacy statute fills in.
56. See infra text accompanying notes 61-66.

1152

MERCER LAW REVIEW

(Vol. 48

account of the model given in Part II is correct, then the court can be
expected either to recognize the effectiveness of a disinheritance
provision (using the simple-exclusion rule or the nonsurvival rule) or to
blame its ineffectiveness on the ambiguity of the intestacy statute.
Every case that refuses to give direct5 7 effect to a disinheritance
provision on any other ground represents a rejection of the directive
model.
The cases discussed in this section fit that description, but they hold
an additional, special interest. These are cases in which the court
addresses the issue of what, precisely, a testator is trying to do in a
disinheritance provision. The court then produces an interpretation of
the disinheritance provision that is unjustified by the actual language
used and completely unmotivated under the directive model but
explicable under the declaration model.
The cases fall into three categories. First are those cases in which the
court reads the disinheritance provision as a dispositive provision, an
attempt by the testator to affect directly the ownership of his property.
But because such an attempt must be made by a declaration, the court
reads the disinheritance provision in the only way that makes sense (or,
as we might say, "counts") as a declaration: an attempt to divest an heir
of an interest he already owns. In the second and third groups, the
court refuses to read the disinheritance provision as a dispositive
provision because (I suggest) it does not count as a declaration; the
testator cannot, after all, be attempting to control someone else's
property. Instead, the court reads the disinheritance provision as the
testator's commentary on other parts of the will: either an expression
of intent about the proper operation of some other provision (in cases in
the second group) or a statement that no (affirmative) devise is being
made to the negative beneficiary (in cases in the third group).
We begin our discussion of the first group of cases by comparing our
objections to a disinheritance provision under a declaration model with
the courts' standard justification for the orthodox rule. We noted earlier
that a disinheritance provision seems to fail as a declaration because it
does not appear to do anything. A disinheritance provision, rather than
purporting to create ownership by declaring the owners, simply states
what is already the case: The negative beneficiary does not own any of
the testator's property. We noted also the problem of indeterminacy: To
declare that one person is not the owner of property is to declare that
anyone or everyone is the owner. Both these objections were answered,
after a fashion, by assuming that the negative beneficiary already owns

57. We shall see below how some courts give indirect effect to a disinheritance provision

in a way that reflects the declaration model.
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his share of the intestate property at the testator's death and that the
disinheritance provision is an attempt to destroy that share and transfer
it to another;58 the intestacy statute acts first and the will afterwards.
In this way, the disinheritance provision counts as a declaration-albeit
an unsuccessful one because the testator is attempting to affect the
ownership of another's property.
It is just this solution that the courts appear to be considering in the
standard justification for the rule. We saw earlier that the courts have
stated that a disinheritance provision is ineffective because it "can only
apply to property actually passing through the will and has no effect as
to intestate property"59 or because "the intestate property passes by law
rather than by will, [and therefore] the statute and not the testator
controls the distribution of this property."60 This explanation is based
on the premise that the property whose ownership the testator is
attempting to affect is already intestate property; because it already
belongs to the heirs, obviously the testator has no power over it. Earlier,
we criticized this explanation as simply circular. The circularity
disappears when we observe that the courts are simply assuming an
interpretation of a disinheritance provision under which it makes sense
as a declaration.
This view of the matter appears with greater clarity in one of the
earliest cases, Ward v. Dodd."' There, the testator expressed an intent
that the negative beneficiary take nothing in addition to the life estate
in real property devised to him: The life estate was to be the negative
beneficiary's "full portion of'82 the testator's property. A part of the

residue passed in intestacy, and the negative beneficiary was an heir."
The court states that a will beneficiary cannot be deprived of his
intestate share unless "it appears clearly that such was the testator's

58. The indeterminacy problem is solved if we are willing to say that the shares of the
other heirs automatically absorb it, so to speak. This would give a simple-exclusion rule,
however.
59. In re Estate of Swanson, 140 N.W.2d 665, 667 (Neb. 1966). Cf In re Estate of
Smith, 353 S.W.2d 721, 724 (Mo. 1962) ("[tlhe negative admonition applies only to property
passing under the will").
60. Cook v. Seeman, 858 S.W.2d 114, 115 (Ark. 1993) (will lacked residuary clause).
Essentially the same rationale is given in Kimley v. Whittaker, 306 A.2d 443, 444 (N.J.
1973), discussed infra text accompanying notes 104-19. See also In re Weissmann's Will,

243 N.Y.S. 127, 131 (Surr. Ct. 1930) (ascribing orthodox rule to "the English conception of
the semivested rights of a natural heir in his ancestor's estate").

61. 5 A. 650 (N.J. Ch. 1886).
62. Id. at 650 (internal quotation marks omitted).

63. Id. at 651.
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intention."" The court goes on to describe the precise way in which
that intention is given effect:
A testator may provide that his legatee or devisee, in consideration of
the legacy or devise, shall not enjoy such legal right [to take under
intestate succession]. Such a provision might perhaps be regarded as
equivalent to a gift [devise] of the property from which the legatee or
devisee is so excluded, to the testator's other heirs or next of kin. If it
were not so regarded, the legatee or devisee would be put to his
election.'
Under neither one of the court's two alternative readings is the
disinheritance provision represented as an instruction to the personal
representative to refrain from distributing property to the negative
beneficiary. Under the first alternative (in the second quoted sentence),
the court avoids the problem altogether by suggesting an (implied)
affirmative gift to the testator's other heirs.
Under the second alternative (in the third quoted sentence), the court
describes an "equitable election." According to the doctrine of that name,
if the will makes a devise to a beneficiary and purports to devise that
beneficiary's own property to another, the beneficiary is "put to his
election": He must elect either to take the devised property, in which
case he must allow his own property to pass in accordance with the
testator's will, or to keep his own property, in which case he must
relinquish the devised property."
It is clear, then, that under the court's second alternative reading the
disinheritance provision in Ward does not prevent the negative
beneficiary from taking in the first instance. If it did, the doctrine of
equitable election would never have come into play. That doctrine
applies only when the testator is making a devise of the beneficiary's
own property-here, the intestate property inherited by the negative
beneficiary. The court gives the disinheritance provision an interpretation that, as we have seen, allows the provision to count as a declaration.
The testator is attempting to transfer the negative beneficiary's property
(the intestate share he has already received) to the other heirs. This

64. Id
65. Id.
66. A leading treatise describes the doctrine as follows:
When a testator makes a gift by will in such a manner that the gift or other
provisions of the will are in conflict with some other right of the devisee, the gift
is considered to be the equivalent of an offer, the acceptance of which requires the
surrender of the other right. The will is viewed as offering something to the
devisee in return for his property or interest.
5 BOWE & PARKER, supra note 2, § 47.1, at 595-96 (footnotes omitted).
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interpretation satisfies the declaration model at the cost of invoking the
equitable election doctrine.
The cases in the second group contain a different kind of evidence for
the declaration model and, as we shall see later, demonstrate the
inadequacy of the standard remedies. In these cases, the courts appear
eager to give effect to the intent expressed in a disinheritance provision.
But they do so in a way that is consistent with the declaration model.
The disinheritance provision has no direct effect on ownership of the
testator's property because it is not a dispositive provision at all; it
cannot be one because (I suggest) it makes no sense as a declaration.
Instead, a disinheritance provision is an expression of the testator's
intent about the proper operation of another provision in the will-or
even outside it.
In Strauss v. Strauss, a codicil devised the income from a trust fund
to the testator's son Albert (one of eight children)." The codicil
continued with a disinheritance provision: "The foregoing trust fund
which I have created for the benefit of my said son, Albert Strauss, shall
be and is in full of all claim of any kind or character which he is to have
out of my estate."69 Elsewhere the codicil stated, "I hereby expressly
declare that my son, Albert, shall have no other or further interest in my
said estate or any part thereof, except as provided and given him in this
codicil."7" The residue was devised "in equal parts" to the testator's
seven other children (whom he named). Another provision stated that
the children of a deceased child would take his or her share of the
residue. One of the children (not Albert) predeceased the testator
without issue. Thus, unless the residuary devise were construed as a
class gift7 ' under these circumstances," the predeceasing child's share
of the residue would pass in intestacy to all the testator's surviving

67.

2 N.E.2d 699 (I1. 1936).

68. Id. at 701.
69. Id.

70. Id. at 701-02.
71. In a class gift, the share of a predeceasing beneficiary is distributed to the others,
so that the entire subject matter of the devise passes to those beneficiaries who survive the
testator.
72. I have said "under these circumstances" because clearly the testator did not intend
a class gift under other circumstances. Had the predeceasing child been survived by
children, those grandchildren would have taken the predeceasing child's share of the
residue by explicit provision in the will. For the sake of simplicity, I shall refer to the
supposed intent by the testator in Strauss that the surviving residuary beneficiaries take
the entire residue under the circumstances that occurred (i.e., the death of one of the
residuary beneficiaries before the testator without children) as an intent to devise the
residue as a "class gift." This is consistent with the court's use of the term.
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children-including Albert if the disinheritance provision were not
effective.
The court uses the disinheritance provision only as an aid in
construction of the residuary devise.7" The court notes:
Where an intention to disinherit an heir is expressed clearly and
manifestly in a will, so as to leave no*reason for doubt, a construction
of the will which would leave the testator intestate as to any portion
of the property will not be adopted to defeat that intention and thus
allow the heir to have some share in the estate.74
The court then proceeds to consider whether the residuary devise is a
class gift. Under the "general rule,"75 a gift to persons named individually (as were the residuary beneficiaries in this case) is a distributive
gift76 and not a class gift77 "Met reasons are here found in the
language and structure of the will for deciding that the intent of the
testator, which is, of course, paramount to the rule [requiring construction as a distributive gift], would be best subserved by disregarding
it."Ts Although the court purports to find "numerous" expressions of a
countervailing intent, 79 by far the most important is the disinheritance
provision. That "alone would have been sufficient"8 0 to construe the
residuary devise as a class gift, and it "is as binding upon the court as
if it had been attached to and made part of the... residuary clause of
the will."' Because the residuary clause is a class gift, no property
passes in intestacy, and Albert inherits nothing.
What is striking about the opinion is its juxtaposition of an insistence
on the primacy of the intent expressed in the disinheritance provision
and a refusal to serve that intent in the most straightforward way. To
put the matter differently, it is odd that a provision clearly expressing

73. Prior cases in the jurisdiction fully embraced the orthodox rule. E.g., Tea v. Millen,
101 N.E. 209, 211 (Ill. 1913).
74. 2 N.E.2d at 703.
75. Id.
76. In a distributive gift, the share of a beneficiary who predeceases the testator lapses.
If it is a pre-residuary distributive gift, the share falls into the residue. If it is a residuary
distributive gift, the share passes (under the traditional rule) in intestacy. See authorities

cited supra note 8.
77. 2 N.E.2d at 703.
78. Id.
79. Id. By way of summary, the court states that the will "placed Albert in a preferred
class by himself" while "[t]he other seven children were all treated as a separate class, with
common and equal interests, and were to take whatever remained after the debts were

paid, Albert's trust fund created, and their mother provided for." Id.
80. Id.
81. Id.
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the testator's intent about distribution of his property does not directly
affect that distribution; it is not a dispositive provision at all. Thus, the
court takes account of the disinheritance provision in the only way
allowed under the declaration model: 2 not as a declaration, but as a
mere expression of intent serving to inform the court about the proper
interpretation of some other, dispositive provision.
There are two unfortunate consequences of the court's approach. The
less serious consequence is distortion of class-gift doctrine. Given the
facts of the case and precedent, there is every reason to construe the
residuary devise as a distributive gift, not a class gift. First, as the
court itself notes, the residuary beneficiaries were individually named,
a fact which by prior decisions is strong evidence of a distributive gift.
Second, there was no persuasive extrinsic evidence of an intent to make
a class gift.83 Third, and most importantly, the testator demonstrated
elsewhere in the will that he knew how to give an explicit description of
a class gift. In creating a trust for his wife, 4 the testator directed that
upon her death the corpus be distributed "equally among my children
who shall then (at the death of my said wife) be living, and in the case
of the death of any of said children, then to my children who shall then
(at the death of my said wife) be surviving."85 The absence of similar
language describing a survivorship feature in devising the residue
indicates that the residuary devise was not intended as a class gift. 6
The more serious consequence of the approach in Strauss is that it
might lead, under other facts, to a disinheritance of all heirs, not just
the negative beneficiary. Now it is true that under the facts of the case,

82.

If, that is, it is not an invalid attempt to change the ownership of property already

owned by the heirs.
83. The court refers to a partnership agreement made by the testator that also excluded
Albert from participation. Id. at 702. This simply evidences the intent already stated in
the disinheritance provision of the will.

84. The provision was revoked after the wife's death. Id. at 701.
85. Id. (emphasis added). The provision went on to exclude Albert. This is not a class
gift, as it requires survivorship beyond the death of the testator, but the survivorship

feature is similar to that under a class gift.
86. An intestacy would be prevented under a rule that the entire residue always passes
to the surviving residuary beneficiaries, that is, whether or not the residuary devise
satisfies the orthodox criteria for a class gift. The court in Strauss appears not to be
applying such a rule, however. It is true that the court states, "It is the general rule to so
construe a residuary clause as to prevent the intestacy of any part of the testators estate
unless there is an apparent intention to the contrary." Id. at 703. But the court appears
to do little or nothing with this observation. The court's purpose might be to support the
conclusion that a specific legacy to the predeceasing child passed by the residuary clause.
In any event, we have already noted that the court states that the disinheritance provision
"alone would have been sufficient," id., for the court's decision.
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the court's approach produces the same result that would be produced
by the straightforward implementation of the disinheritance provision
allowed under the directive model (combined with an honest application
of class-gift doctrine). That reasoning would proceed as follows. Prior
cases indicate that the residuary devise is a distributive gift. An
intestacy results, therefore, with respect to the share of the predeceasing
child. Because the testator plainly indicated his wish that Albert take
nothing, the intestate property passes consistently with that intent.
Under either the nonsurvival rule or the simple-exclusion rule, 7 the
intestate property passes to the testator's six other children (that is, the
surviving children excluding Albert).' As we have seen, the approach
used by the court in Strauss produces the same result but for a different
reason: The six other children take the entire residue because they are
the surviving members of the supposed class.
So it is not the result that is objectionable; it is the theory by which
the court reaches that result. Under the rule applied by the court, "an
intention to disinherit an heir ... [prohibits] a construction of the will
which would leave the testator intestate as to any portion of the
property," 9 that is, a class-gift construction is required. But this rule
is a bad one because a class-gift construction of the residuary devise does
much more than disinherit the negative beneficiary; it disinherits all the
heirs." Thus, suppose that in Strauss the residue had been devised to
two friends of the testator, and one had predeceased him. The court's
rule, literally applied, would require construction of the residuary devise
as a class gift; this would lead to a disinheritance of all the testator's
children, not just Albert. That result is justified neither by the language

87. The testator's wife predeceased him; his heirs were his seven surviving children.

Id. at 700. Therefore, the testator's heirs other than Albert (applying the simple-exclusion
rule) were the six children who were residuary beneficiaries.

The takers under a

nonsurvival rule would be the same persons, because the predeceasing child was not
survived by issue. See id.
88. An alternative rule is that euery residuary devise to more than one person,. even if
they are individually named, is a devise to those persons who survive the testator. This
is a reasonable interpretation of a residuary clause, which, after all, purports to dispose

of the testator's entire estate. In that event, there would be no intestacy, and the entire
residue would be distributed to the six surviving children other than Albert, just as the
court decreed. My objection is to the court's use of the disinheritanceprovision as the

evidence of the testator's intent to make a class gift of the residue.
89. 2 N.E.2d at 703.
90. See Strohm v. McMullen, 89 N.E.2d 383 (Ill. 1949). There, the court, distinguishing
Strauss,finds that the disinheritance provision does not indicate that the residuary devise
is a class gift. Id. at 387. "The fact that the testator did not want certain relatives to

share in his estate does not indicate that he desired that the named residuary devisees be
clothed with the right of survivorship." Id.
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of the will nor by the intestacy statute.9 1 If it be said in reply that the
court in Strauss would not find a class gift in the hypothetical case
supposed because there is no intent to disinherit all the heirs, then we
have a different problem: A disinheritance provision will be effective
only under the fortuitous circumstance of an identity between the
residuary beneficiaries and the heirs other than the negative beneficiary.92

Blochowitz v. Blochowitzss is a variation on Strauss. The testator
executed deeds of land to his four sons. His will, executed on the same
day, stated, "All of my four sons ... are entitled to no further part of
inheritance as all each and every one of them have received all that they
are entitled to. 94 Some property passed by intestacy; the court held
that the sons did not share in it.95 The disinheritance provision, says
the court, should be "considered in the nature of a contemporaneous
charge of an equitable advancement by ancestor to heirs."' e The court
is referring to the doctrine of advancements. Under that doctrine, an
inter-vivos gift made by a decedent to his child will generally be charged

91. Where the negative beneficiaries are all the testator's heirs (or relatives), the classgift construction is justified. Cf Iozapavichus v. Fournier, 308 A.2d 573, 574 (Me. 1973)
(construing a devise of entire estate as class gift when will provided, "I purposely and
intentionally omit all my relatives from this my Last Will and Testament"); Sutherland v.
Sutherland, 298 N.E.2d 869, 870-72 (Mass. App. Ct. 1973) (construing a devise of entire
estate to two named persons as class gift where will provided, "I leave nothing to any
relative of mine who has not been hereinbefore mentioned").
Horseman v. Horseman, 217 S.W.2d 645 (Ky. Ct. App. 1949), also can be distinguished
from Strauss. The testator devised his farm to his wife for life, remainder to three of his
four sons. Id. at 646. The will continued:
Item Five: I have another son, Esten B. Horseman, I have not made any provision
for him in this will. This is not because of any lack of affection for my said son,
but my three other sons hereinabove named have worked with me to make what
I have, and I feel that it is only just and right that I should provide for them as
hereinabove stated.
Id. The disfavored son, Esten, had lived with a relative since shortly after his birth. Id.
One of the three sons who were remaindermen predeceased the testator. There was no
residuary clause. The court relies on Item Five to conclude that the gift of the remainder
is a class gift. Id. at 648. This is a very different case from Strauss: Item Five is much
more the expression of an intent that the two surviving sons take the remainder than the
expression of an intent that Esten take nothing.
92. Similar to Strauss is In re Young's Estate, 232 N.Y.S. 427, 428 (Surr. Ct. 1928)
(provision stating that testator "leave[s] nothing" to those heirs not mentioned as residuary
beneficiaries taken as evidence that devise of entire estate was class gift).
93. 266 N.W. 644 (Neb. 1936).
94. Id. at 646.
95. The testator was survived also by his wife and daughters. Id.
96. Id. at 652.
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against the child's intestate share if that was the decedent's intent.97
Whether an inter-vivos gift is treated as an advancement is a function
of the donor's intent when the gift is made-here, an intent expressed
in the disinheritance provision. As in Strauss, the court in Blochowitz
reads the disinheritance provision as an expression of the testator's
intent regarding the operation of some other, dispositive language-here,
language outside the will itself. The disinheritance provision itself
cannot be a dispositive provision because it makes no sense as a
declaration.98
So far, we have considered cases in which the courts have read a
disinheritance provision as something other than an instruction to the
personal representative to refrain from distributing property to the
negative beneficiary. In each case, the strained reading was completely
unmotivated under the directive model but consistent with the declaration model-consistent, that is, in the sense that the disinheritance
provision could not work as a dispositive provision because it could not
be a successful declaration or a declaration at all.
In the third group of cases, the declaration model induces a different
strained (mis)reading of a disinheritance provision. It is viewed as an
"illocutionary denegation,"99 that is, as the denial of a declaration in
favor of the negative beneficiary, Thus, when the testator states her
desire that B2 take none of her property, the testator is simply denying
that any affirmative devise is being made to B2. Such an illocutionary
denegation cannot possibly have any effect on distribution of the
testator's intestate estate. This interpretation has been adopted in at
least three cases.'O° As I hope to make clear in my discussion of those
cases immediately below, the best explanation is that the courts are
operating under the assumption of a declaration model.
In In re Estate of Levy,' ° ' the will stated, "I make no provision in
this my Last Will and Testament for my wife, Gertrude nor for the issue

97. See 6 BOWE & PARKER, supra note 2, §§ 55.1, at 300, 55.5, at 308. Immediately

following the passage quoted in the text, the court characterizes the disinheritance
provision alternatively as "a condition inhering in the deeds of gift, or as substantially a
part of the consideration of such deeds." 266 N.W. at 652. These seem to be simply other

ways of stating the advancement doctrine.
98. Indeed, the viability of the orthodox rule after Blochowitz is shown by the court's
subsequent decisions, which endorse the orthodox rule without citing Blochowitz. In re
Estate of Swanson, 140 N.W.2d 665,667 (Neb. 1966); Kula v. Kula, 31 N.W.2d 96,98 (Neb.
1948); In re Estate of Coryell, 118 N.W.2d 1002, 1005 (Neb. 1963).
99. SEARLE & VANDERVEKEN, supra note 29, at 4, 76; SEARLE, SPEECH ACTS, supra
note 29, at 32.

100. In re Estate of Levy, 196 So. 2d 225 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1967); Kimley v.
Whittaker, 306 A.2d 443 (N.J. 1973); Cattell v. Evans, 4 N.W.2d 67 (Mich. 1942).
101.

196 So. 2d 225 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1967).
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of my marriage. I have not seen my wife for approximately eleven years
and have never seen the issue of my marriage." 1°2 According to the
court, that provision is the denial of a declaration; it serves only to state
the testator's "intent... not to include [the negative beneficiaries]...
among the legatees.""°3 To be sure, that is the literal meaning of the
first sentence in the quotation from the will. But surely the testator
meant to say something other than what was already abundantly clear
from the rest of the will. Nor does it help the court's interpretation to
point out that the testator did say something else: his description of the
motives for leaving out his wife and issue (the second sentence in the
quotation from the will). Those motives make clearer still his intent
that they take no part of his estate.
The court's cramped reading is a wholly unreasonable one if the task
at hand is to discover the testator's intent, but it is a wholly reasonable
one if the task is to classify every provision in terms congenial to the
declaration model. If a court expects the testator to express himself only
in declarations and if a declaration of nonownership makes no sense (as
I have argued earlier), then the only alternative is the denial of a
declaration. To put the matter crudely, the negation has to go somewhere.
A New Jersey Supreme Court case followed the same approach, but in
a much more striking way because there the testator could hardly have
been more explicit in expressing her intent that the negative beneficiaries take nothing. The fourth paragraph of the will in Kimley v.
Whittaker"4 gave the entire estate to the testator's husband with no
gift over in case of his nonsurvival.'0 5 The husband predeceased the
testator. The subsequent two paragraphs contained the disinheritance
provision:
FIFTH: For reasons I care not to disclose, I hereby make no
provision for my daughter, Mary Palmer, nor my grandchildren and it
is my will that my daughter and grandchildren be deprived of any
interest whatsoever that I may own at my death.
SIXTH: Those of my heirs not herein mentioned or provided for have
been omitted by me with full knowledge thereof.'"

102. Id. at 226 (quoting from the will).
103. Id. at 230.
104. 306 A.2d 443 (N.J. 1973).
105. Id. at 144.
106. Id. (emphasis added).
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The testator was survived by the negative beneficiaries (one of whom,
her daughter
Mary, was her sole heir) and a number of other rela17
tives.

0

The court begins its discussion by reciting the orthodox rule that a
disinheritance provision is ineffective.'
"One reason given for the
rule is that since the intestate property passes by law, not by will, the
statute, not the testator, controls its distribution."'09 The court notes,
however, that the New Jersey cases are in conflict, some holding that the
negative beneficiary does not take, others stating that "the testator's
intent would control, but that such intent must be clearly expressed and
the words used free from doubt."110
That test seems to be satisfied here, and the trial court so held."'
According to the trial court (and as paraphrased by the New Jersey
Supreme Court), "paragraph Fifth of decedent's will constituted a strong
and unambiguous expression of intent to exclude decedent's daughter
and the daughter's children from receiving any part of decedent's estate
even though it was distributed as intestate property under the statute.""12
'
The appellate division upheld the trial court's decision. 3
The New Jersey Supreme Court reversed; it did not agree that the
testator had expressed a clear intent to disinherit. 4
The court's rationale is as follows (numerals have been inserted for
reference):
(1] Paragraph Fifth can be read as a confirmation of paragraph
Fourth wherein the entire estate is left to the husband. [2] In other
words, the testatrix might have intended to indicate that she was
aware of her daughter and grandchildren, but, nevertheless, wanted
everything to go to her husband. [3] The "reasons" for the exclusionary
clause, which testatrix said she cared "not to disclose," might have been
the husband's needs or mental or physical condition. [4] It cannot be
said that the paragraph clearly expressed the intent that the daughter
(and her children) be excluded should the bequest to the husband
lapse. [5] The reference in paragraph Sixth to the knowing omission
of "[t]hose of my heirs not herein mentioned or provided for" would

107.

Id.

108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id. "However, in none of these cases [in the latter category] were the words used
found to be free from doubt." Id. at 444-45.
111. Id. at 445.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id.
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seem to indicate that the decedent had in mind testamentary disposi115
tion only.
This passage constitutes a statement that the disinheritance provision
is the denial of an affirmative declaration. An explicit statement that
the daughter and her children take nothing appears, of course, in
paragraph Fifth. Yet we are told by the court (in sentences [1] and [21
of the quoted passage) that paragraph Fifth merely confirms that the
only devise she wishes to make is the one to her husband (which,
because it is a devise of the entire estate, excludes the daughter and her
children from any share). This is to characterize paragraph Fifth as the
denial of a declaration in favor of the persons named there. Sentence [3
is further evidence that the court reads the disinheritance provision as
the denial of an affirmative declaration. In the court's view, the only
"reasons" there set forth for the disinheritance provision have nothing
to do with any desire that the daughter and her children take nothing.
Rather, they serve only to explain (if true) why the testator devised her
entire estate to the husband, that is, why she made no devise to the
daughter and her children. Sentences [31 and [4]-in which the court
speculates about the possible motives for a provision and then finds the
provision ineffective because the supposed motives cannot be fulfilled-would be preposterous if it were made in connection with an
affirmative devise.
Finally, the court assumes an illocutionary denegation when it
responds to an argument made by the testator's other relatives (who
would take in intestacy if the disinheritance provision were effective).
They argued that the "will should be construed so as to incorporate by
reference the [intestacy statute] . . ., but at the same time exclude...
[the negative beneficiaries] from participation.""' This is, of course,
an argument in favor of an implied devise to the other heirs. 7 The
court appeared to accept that argument as an accurate statement of the
issue (though not necessarily of the conclusion): The disinheritance
provision can be effective only if there is an implied affirmative devise
to the testator's other surviving relatives, who would be her heirs in the
absence of the negative beneficiaries.
But the court refused to imply such a devise. According to the court,
the respondent's contention "is unsupported by any evidence either
extrinsic or found in the will itself. It is pure speculation to say that

115. Id.
116. Id
117. Or, under a nonsurvival rule, to the persons who would take in the event of the
negative beneficiary predeceasing the testator.
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The court is more explicit on this

Our conclusion is (1) that decedent did not incorporate the statutory
scheme of distribution into her will to be applicable in the event her
husband predeceased her, and (2) that paragraph Fifth of decedent's
will does not contain a clear expression of intent that it was to be
effective where an intestacy has come about and the estate is being
distributed under the statute. 19
Thus, only if the testator was thinking about intestacy when she wrote
the disinheritance provision is a court justified in reading that provision
as applicable to intestate property. Otherwise, it applies only to
property already disposed of under the will; that is, it states simply that
no affirmative devise is being made to the negative beneficiaries.
A third illocutionary denegation case can be dealt with briefly. In
Cattell v. Evans,2 ° the will devised thirty-five dollars each to the
testator's son and daughter and further stated, "I give nothing, except
the two legacies above provided for, to the immediate members of my
family [the son and daughter] because in the separation from my wife
I paid a large sum which I feel is all they are entitled to out of my
estate." 2' The court characterizes the disinheritance provision as
"merely explanatory" of the absence of further devises to them;'22 there
was no intent to disinherit.
VI.

DEFICIENCIES OF THE STANDARD REMEDIES

Two remedies have been proposed as the means for reforming the
orthodox rule. First, there is the judicially implied devise: The court,
without legislative intervention, implies a devise of the negative
beneficiary's intestate share to the persons who would have taken had
the negative beneficiary predeceased the testator.'23 The judicially
implied devise suffers from an important defect: There is every reason

118.
119.
120.
121.

306 A.2d at 445 (emphasis added).
Id
4 N.W.2d 67 (Mich. 1942).
Id. at 69 (quoting from will; emphasis added).

122. Id.
123. See Heaton, supra note 3, at 188-93. It is not absolutely clear that Heaton
endorses a nonsurvival rule. Under his approach, "the excluded heir is treated as if he had
predeceased the testator, and his share of the intestate portion of the estate is divided
among the testator's remaining heirs." Id. at 179 (emphasis added). Elsewhere in the
article, Heaton describes a distribution to the testator's "other heirs." E.g., id. at 189. It
is not clear whether "remaining heirs" or "other heirs" would include persons who would
be heirs only under the supposition that the "excluded heir" predeceased the testator.
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to doubt that the courts will create it. Courts are, in general, very
reluctant to imply any provisions in a will. To do so would, in the view
of the courts, be adding words to the will, contrary to the statutory
requirement that the testator express her wishes in writing. Moreover,
the reform represented by the judicially implied devise is incomplete in
that it provides no independent motivation for its adoption. To be sure,
the judicially implied devise is said to fulfill the intent expressed in a
disinheritance provision, but the basic point of the typical case applying
the orthodox rule is that such an intent simply cannot be given
effect 124
Moreover, even if a court were willing in principle to imply a devise,
the cases with which we are concerned present some of the weakest
reasons for doing so. The court is being asked to imply a devise on the
125
basis of a supposed probable intent that the other intestate takers
be the beneficiaries, 28 an intent for which there is usually no evidence
in the will. The testator might not have known-indeed, probably did
not know-the identity of the other intestate takers and had no intent
about them; all she intended is that the negative beneficiary get nothing.
The second remedy for the orthodox rule is a legislative one. Uniform
Probate Code ("UPC") section 2-101(b) 127 provides:
A decedent by will may expressly exclude or limit the right of an
individual or class to succeed to property of the decedent passing by
intestate succession. If that individual or a member of that class
survives the decedent, the share of the decedent's intestate estate to
which that individual or class would have succeeded passes as if that
individual or each member of that class had disclaimed his [or her]

share. 128
The disclaimer provision of the UPC, in turn, provides generally for a
nonsurvival rule."2

124. See supra text accompanying notes 18-22. A judicially implied devise will not
work in a case like Ward v. Dodd, 5 A. 650 (N.J. Ch. 1886), for a different reason: It is
treated as a devise of property already owned by the negative beneficiary, See supra text
accompanying notes 64-68.
125. Recall that we are using this term to refer to the persons who would take if the
negative beneficiary predeceased the testator.
126. See Heaton, supra note 3, at 189-90 (describing the doctrine in approximately this
way).
127. 8 U.L.A. 97 (Supp. 1996).
128. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-101(b), 8 U.L.A. 97 (Supp. 1996) (brackets in original).
Cf id. § 1-201(56), 8 U.L.A. 14 (Supp. 1996) ("will" includes a testamentary instrument

containing only a disinheritance provision).
129. Id. § 2-801(d)(1), 8 U.L.A. 195 (Supp. 1996) (disclaimant generally treated as
predeceasing the decedent). I say "generally" because the intestate estate will not always
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The remedy given in the UPC is even more problematic than the
judicially implied devise. The UPC requires the testator to "expressly
exclude or limit the right ... to succeed to property ... passing by
intestate succession."13 This appears to require that the testator refer
expressly to property passing by intestate succession. In the typical
disinheritance provision, no such reference appears.
But, for the sake of argument, let us put both of these problems aside.
Let us assume that the courts are willing to imply a devise of the
negative beneficiary's intestate share to the other intestate takers. And
let us assume that the UPC would be satisfied by a disinheritance
provision expressing the intent that the negative beneficiary take none
of the testator's property (without necessarily referring explicitly to
property passing by intestate succession). Both remedies still require
that the disinheritance provision be evidence of an intent about
distributionof intestate property. The fact that the implied devise is a
devise in favor of the other intestate takers (rather than, say, to the
other beneficiaries in the will) creates this requirement. The same
intent is required under the UPC; the disinheritance provision must
concern "the right of an individual or class to succeed to property of the
decedent passing by intestate succession." 131
But the testator likely has no such intent. In almost all the cases
involving a disinheritance provision, the testator is not thinking of
intestate property because she does not expect any to exist;13 2 her will
contains a residuary clause and purports to dispose of all her property.
The intent expressed in a disinheritance provision is simply an intent
that the negative beneficiary take no part of the testator's property,
whatever the basis of his claim. The testator does not know what that
basis might be. Or perhaps she does know of a basis other than
intestate succession.' 33 A disinheritance provision does not necessarily, and does not typically, represent an intent about the intestate
property in particular.
This view of the matter is reflected in some of the cases discussed in
the preceding part. In Strauss'34 the testator's statement that an

pass exactly as it would if the negative beneficiary had predeceased the testator. The
difference arises from the UPC's scheme of distribution to issue by "representation," id. § 2106(b), 8 U.L.A. 101 (Supp. 1996), a matter beyond the scope of this Article.
130. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-101(b), 8 U.L.A. 97 (Supp. 1996) (emphasis added).
131. Id. (emphasis added).
132. See Gordon, supra note 12, at 11-14 (making the same point but reaching the
conclusion that disinheritance provisions should be ineffective).
133. Under appropriate circumstances, the negative beneficiary might claim as a
substitute beneficiary under an antilapse statute.
134. See supra text accompanying notes 69-91.
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affirmative'devise to his son "shall be and is in full of all claim of any
kind or character which he is to have out of my estate," 13 far from
being an expression of the testator's intent regarding his intestate
property, was (according to the court) an expression of an intent that
there be no intestate property, that is, that the residuary devise be a
class gift." As we have noted, the intent to give the residue as a
class gift, though it may be equivalent to an intent that no property pass
in intestacy, is not equivalent to an intent that a particular heir or heirs
receive nothing.
In Kimley 37 and the other illocutionary denegation cases, 138 the
courts find a disinheritance provision to be merely a description of the
fact of (and the reasons for) the testator's failure to include a devise in
favor of the negative beneficiary. It does not represent the testator's
intent about distribution of the intestate property. Moreover, in view of
the clarity and explicitness of the disinheritance provision in Kimley--"it
is my will that my daughter and grandchildren be deprived of any
interest whatsoever that I may own at my death"--it is difficult to see
how a testator can ever write a disinheritance provision that would
invoke either the judicially implied devise or the UPC rule.
VII.

CONCLUSION

The most reliable way to relieve a symptom is to cure the disease.
The symptom here is the courts' refusal to give straightforward effect to
a disinheritance provision. In this Article, I have sought to identify the
disease as the underlying model of a will.
A court operating under the directive model would give effect to a
disinheritance provision in the simplest, most straightforward way: Any
inconsistent distribution under the intestacy statute is ineffective. In all
other respects, the residue is distributed under the statute to the
persons named there. There is no implied devise to anyone.
A court operating under the declaration model is unable to reach that
solution. Such a court is forced to read a disinheritance provision either
as an ineffective dispositive provision (ineffective because it is a
declaration about someone else's property), an effective nondispositive
provision (used only to construe other language), or indeed nothing at all
(a statement about the absence of a devise). In the latter two instances,

135. 2 N.E.2d at 701.
136, See supra notes 67-88 and accompanying text.
137. See supra text accompanying notes 104-19.
138. See supra text accompanying notes 99-122.
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the courts give to a disinheritance provision an interpretation that
appears to put the case out of the reach of the standard remedies.
Reform of the law relating to the effectiveness of a disinheritance
provision lies most simply and most reliably in the courts' abandonment
of the declaration model in favor of the directive model. This Article is
an attempt to push the courts in that direction.

